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Why do wars occur and recur, especially in cases when the decisions involved are 
made by careful and rational actors? There are many answers to this question. Given the 
importance of the question, and the wide range of answers, it is essential to have a 
perspective on the various sources of conflict. In this chapter we provide a critical 
overview of the theory of war. In particular, we provide not just a taxonomy of causes of 
conflict, but also some insight into the necessity of and interrelation between different 
factors that lead to war. 
Let us offer a brief preview of the way in which we categorize causes of war. 
There are two prerequisites for a war between (rational) actors. One is that the costs of 
war cannot be overwhelmingly high. By that we mean that there must be some plausible 
situations in the eyes of the decision makers such that the anticipated gains from a war in 
terms of resources, power, glory, territory, and so forth exceed the expected costs of 
conflict, including expected damages to property and life. Thus, for war to occur with 
rational actors, at least one of the sides involved has to expect that the gains from the 
conflict will outweigh the costs incurred. Without this prerequisite there can be lasting 
peace.
1
 Second, as cogently argued by Fearon (1995), there has to be a failure in 
bargaining, so that for some reason there is an inability to reach a mutually advantageous 
and enforceable agreement. The main tasks in understanding war between rational actors 
are thus to see why bargaining fails and what incentives or circumstances might lead 
countries to arm in ways such that the expected benefits from war outweigh the costs for 
at least one of the sides. 
A good portion of our overview of the causes of war is thus spent discussing a 
framework of different bargaining failures. We emphasize that understanding sources of 
bargaining failure is not only useful as a categorization, but also because different types 
of failures lead to different conclusions about the types of wars that emerge, and 
particularly about things like the duration of war. We return to comment on this after 
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 See Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) and Jackson and Morelli (2009) for the point that this is true even when 
armament decisions are endogenous, a subject that we discuss below. 
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discussing various reasons for bargaining failure. Below, we talk in detail about the 
following five reasons for bargaining failure:
2
 
1. Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war. 
2. A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability 
to credibly commit to abide by an agreement. 
3. Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all 
potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are feasible. 
4. Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the 
populations that they represent. 
5. Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some 
coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it.  
To illustrate the importance of understanding which reason lies behind a conflict, 
note that if there is a lack of ability to enforce or commit to an agreement, then a war may 
last a long time. It will last until either one side has emerged victorious, or the situation 
has changed so that the costs of continued conflict have become overwhelmingly high for 
all sides. Such a lack of enforceable agreements is often one of the main ingredients 
leading to protracted wars. In contrast, suppose that enforceable and credible agreements 
are possible, but that the states start with asymmetric information, for instance, about the 
relative strength of one of the two countries. In such a case, there can be a bargaining 
failure which leads to war. However, in such a setting once war really begins the relative 
strengths of the countries can become clearer, and given that credible bargaining is 
possible and can avoid further costs of war the states could then reach an agreement to 
end the war. So, different durations of wars can correspond to different sources of 
bargaining failures. We expand on this below. 
The chapter is organized as follows: For a clearer understanding of the boundaries 
of rationalist versus non rationalist explanations, we start by briefly discussing non-
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rationalist explanations in section 2. Section 3 provides a taxonomy of bargaining failures 
and how these relate to conflict; section 4 contains a discussion of which theories 
described in section 3 shed light on the observations of the democratic peace. In section 5 
we report on the state of the literature on endogenous armaments and power and the 
implications for conflict and war. 
2. The realm of rationality 
Before proceeding to discuss various bargaining failures as causes of war, we 
discuss some of the alternative sources of conflict that are sometimes thought to fall into 
the realm of irrationality.  We argue that many of these are more usefully viewed as being 
rational in nature, and hence the bargaining failure categorization still applies to many 
conflicts that are sometimes thought to be irrational.  In order for our discussion to be as 
unambiguous as possible, we begin by clarifying what we mean when we dichotomize 
between rational and irrational actors. When we refer to a rational action by an agent we 
require that action to maximize the expected payoff to that agent out of the available 
actions and relative to the agent’s beliefs about the potential consequences of the actions. 
This does not necessarily require that the beliefs be accurate, nor that the payoffs of the 
individual agent correspond to what is best for the state or country that he or she might 
represent.
3
 This is a broader definition of a rationalist explanation than is usually 
understood in International Relations, where it is common to associate a rationalist 
approach to realist and neo-realist theories of conflict with unitary actors that are 
exclusively interested in material costs and benefits. Our broader definition should make 
it clear that what matters is that players, given the payoffs that they face from different 
outcomes, choose their actions to maximize it given their beliefs about the opponents’ 
actions, hence the qualification "material costs and benefits" is not necessary, nor it is 
necessary to confine the use of the rationalist approach to the world of unitary actors. 
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 In order for this not to become a tautology, one has to be careful. An "irrational" act can always be 
rationalized simply by saying that it gave the agent taking it a high payoff for some intrinsic reason. Thus 
in order to have bite, the payoffs to agents for various actions have to have some natural specification. 
Although the distinction is thus partly semantic, or reliant on some idea of what natural payoffs should be,  
we still find it to be a useful dichotomy. 
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With this viewpoint in mind, let us discuss some causes of war that are often 
thought of as relying on some level of ``irrationality.’’  As we shall see, with our broad 
definition of rationality, even many of these may be interpreted as rational causes of war.  
This is not simply an issue of semantics, since the distinction has fundamental 
implications for how wars might be initiated, and if and how they can be avoided or 
terminated. 
 
2.1  Religion 
In principle, a war between two theocracies, or two states led by people of 
different religions, can be thought of as having rational explanations. It is a question of 
defining the objectives of the agents. For example, the goal might not be materially 
based, but might be based on the increasing the size of the population of one religion or 
eradicating another. In such situations, even with full commitment and bargaining 
opportunities, there might be no agreement that appeases an aggressor. One reason that 
one might place such motivations outside of the realm of "rationality," is that such 
objectives are often not put forth by a leader as if they are acting by choice, but instead 
leaders claim to be acting on behalf or under the direction of a higher being or religious 
code. Thus, the leaders in such settings do not necessarily view themselves as 
"optimizing" or "choosing" between paths but instead as following ordained directions. 
Perhaps even more importantly, from our perspective, such agents cannot be bargained 
with. That is, even if agreements are available and fully enforceable, such agents are 
driven by a specific goal that may be incompatible with the well-being or autonomy of 
another population.   Thus, there is a critical distinction between a leader who is choosing 
and optimizing, even though the his or her rhetoric may be religious in nature, and a 
leader who believes that he or she acts simply as a channel for a higher being. 
In this light, many wars that are thought of as being religious in nature can still be 
well-understood from a rational perspective. To make this point clear, let us discuss two 
prominent examples that are often considered to be at least partly religious wars: the 
crusades and the 30-year war.  
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Although the crusades were complicated by the fact that the aggressor was a 
coalition of national and sub-national armies, they fell under a common religious flag. 
Beyond the rhetoric, the commonality of interests within the Christian coalition can be 
doubted. As Fisher (1992) remarks about the interests of crusaders: "Undoubtedly, many 
of the Crusaders were inspired by a genuine religious motive next to their mundane 
concern for a share in the spoils. However, the idea of Christian unity failed again to 
achieve political reality. The Crusaders not only carved up the newly won territories in 
the East into petty principalities but also continued to struggle against each other in 
Europe. And they ultimately failed to hold the East precisely because they could not 
square their particular interests with the universal idea that had inspired them..." (Fischer 
1992:438). "Thus, the politics of the Crusades, while showing that religious ideas can 
have some political effect, remained alliances circumscribed by the exigencies of power" 
(1992:443).   Effectively, the crusades involved many factions and took place over many 
fronts and to a large extent involved attempts to gain or regain control of various 
territories, ranging from the Iberian peninsula, to Constantinople, to parts of the middle 
east including Jerusalem. The important aspect of this from our perspective is that the 
crusades took place at least partly due to a lack of ability to credibly commit to abide by 
agreements, to the multiplicity of factions involved on multiple fronts, and due to 
situations with great frictions in communication and in gaining information (e.g., see 
Runciman (1951-4)).   Thus, the crusades can be partly understood from a combination of 
the rationalist perspectives that we discuss below. 
Regarding the 30-year war, even though before 1618 there was an eruption of 
religious divisions within Europe emanating from multiple protestant reforms and 
movements, the religious motivation was used by some leaders to justify actions and to 
mobilize people, when again part of the instability derived from a multi-lateral power 
struggle and a lack of enforceable agreements. As argued by Gutmann (1988), a central 
reason for the failure of many settlement attempts was the difficulty of enforcing a new 
distribution of power that was so different from the official distribution of power 
defended by the papacy and imperial power. The Westphalia agreements that ended the 
war in 1648 cut the connections between some of the territorial and religious disputes, 
and the principles of autonomy and territory that were embodied in the agreement laid a 
 7 
foundation for modern states.
4
 To establish religious tolerance Catholics and Protestants 
were co-mingled within some of the same territories, and religious leaders were 
prohibited from having authority over people in separate territories. Thus, although the 
30-year war involved religious motivations, the various factions were also motivated by 
territory, peace, and autonomy, and were eventually able to find a rather complicated 
agreement that was self-sustaining. 
The long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be viewed as 
another instance of a religious conflict that is often given non-rationalist explanations. 
However, it may more usefully be viewed through a rationalist lens.  One of the central 
difficulties in resolving this middle-eastern conflict is in finding a stable agreement that is 
credible in the long run on behalf of the many different factions that comprise the two 
sides of the conflict. Even though the Oslo peace accords followed land for peace 
principles as one would expect in a rationalist dispute, when violence resumed the blame 
was given to "fundamentalism" on various sides (a typical non-rationalist explanation). 
The rationalist explanation for conflict based on multilateral bargaining, which we 
discuss below, is a more useful lens with which to view this conflict.  In this case, both 
the Israelis and the Palestinians consist of many different constituencies and so although 
it appears to be a bilateral conflict it is in fact multilateral. In such settings, it can be that 
even with fully rational individual actors, agreements are not possible since the states end 
up being inconsistent in their decision-making as they are collectively aggregating the 
preferences of many different actors. This rationalist explanation is one that we discuss in 
more detail below. 
2.2  Revenge 
Revenge is another reason for war that one would instinctively place within the set of 
non-rationalist explanations of war. It is important, however, to distinguish an emotional 
version of revenge from a version of what someone might call revenge in the context of a 
repeated game: the punishment phase involved in trigger strategies of one kind or 
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another. It is the emotional version that falls within the non-rationalist explanations.
5
 
Revenge in emotional terms involves actions motivated exclusively by anger for a past 
action, and not motivated by the potential incentive consequences, nor decided ex ante as 
part of an optimal strategy. Wars driven by revenge are also rare, although famous 
examples include the motivation of the Achaeans' in the Trojan war, at least according to 
the description in the Iliad.
6
 
2.3  Ethnic cleansing and other ideological mass killings 
As in our discussion of religion, one could in principle rationalize the incentives 
to eliminate another ethnic group or minority ideological group by a desire to obtain a 
larger share of the social cake, in the present and/or in the future (see e.g. Esteban and 
Ray (2008)). Such ideologies are generally uncompromising and not justified by reasoned 
choice but by appealing to other principles. 
Hitler had the affirmation of the dominance of his race as a primary objective. 
However, as much as ethnic domination and insanity were part of Hitler's motivations, 
part of the understanding of the Second World War involves seeing why conflict was not 
avoided through concessions, and there rationalist explanations can help. As we mention 
below, for example, the failure of the Munich Agreement was due to credible 
commitment problems, and would have failed even if ethnicity and insanity were not in 
the picture. 
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 Nonetheless, emotional responses can still be understood from an evolutionary perspective as providing 
the ability to commit to certain actions in particular circumstances.    Such commitment can be welfare 
improving in certain circumstances.   For example, in a simple bargaining game, it can be advantageous to 
have the other side know that a player will become angry and refuse further negotiations if not given an 
adequate share of the pie. 
6
 Interestingly, the Iliad also contains numerous discussions of ransoms, slaves, territories, and various 
other prizes and glories as motivations.  However, repeated references are made to revenge for the 
stealing of Helen as well as the defense of honor and anger as the primary impetus for various actions of 
Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Achilles at different points in the war (not to mention fate and the play of 
the gods). 
 9 
A final caveat should be made about the possibility of wars caused by insanity of 
one or more leaders. As we shall see below when we discuss the "spiral" theory of war by 
Schelling and others, the fear of the insanity of an opponent may also cause a rational 
motivation for attacking, so even here the boundary between rational and non rational is 
fuzzy.  We place such explanations within the rationalist explanations because it can be 
the fully rational agents end up in war because of their uncertainty about the rationality of 
others.   
3. Bargaining Failures and War 
As mentioned in the introduction, we see two necessary ingredients for a war 
between rational agents. First, the costs of war cannot be overwhelmingly high. That is, 
for war to occur, at least one of the two parties must see a net potential gain from war 
under some circumstances.
7
 Second, there must be some impediment to bargaining, so 
that an enforceable and credible agreement cannot be reached. Effectively, rational 
decision makers weigh gains and losses from war given their objectives, beliefs, 
environment and constraints, and so if a mutually advantageous agreement is possible 
they should reach it. In an important paper, Fearon (1995) points out the criticality of 
bargaining failure for war. Basically, if rational agents come to the table with mutually 
consistent beliefs about the potential outcome of a costly war, then they should be able to 
reach a bargain to avoid it. In such a situation states can agree to split resources as they 
are expected to be split by a war, and then gain the extra surplus of the avoided 
destruction and costs of war.  
Thus, to really understand the multitude of ways that wars may occur, it is 
illuminating to provide a taxonomy of bargaining failures and their roles in wars.  As 
pointed out in Fearon (1995), there are various ways in which such bargaining might fail. 
It might be that the agents do not have the same beliefs or expectations about the 
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rationality of another, it could be that they attack preemptively even when sure that the outcome will be 
worse than avoiding war.  They could wish to attack because they fear the other will attack, and because 
attacking first is preferable to being attacked.   Thus, the costs not being overwhelminingly high should be 
restricted to cases where rationality is common knowledge or where there are no preemptive advantages. 
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potential outcome of a war. It could also be that they cannot commit to abide by an 
agreement and that there are no external means of enforcing an agreement. It might be 
that resources are indivisible and so there is no way to realize the split of resources that 
are expected as an outcome of a war. Beyond these three ways that are central to Fearon's 
analysis, we add another two. It might also be that the agents who bargain or make 
decisions do not have the same payoffs as the states at large, so that their incentives are 
distorted from what might be mutually beneficial to the populations. Finally, when 
considering multilateral bargaining, it might be that there is no outcome that is stable 
against coalitional deviations from groups of countries. In this section we elaborate on 
these five sources of bargaining failure, and we integrate this picture with some of the 
recent advancements in the theory of war. 
 
3.1  Asymmetric information and bargaining failures 
Asymmetries of information can arise from a variety of sources. It could be an 
asymmetry of information about the relative strengths of the countries either because of 
differences in what they know about each other's armaments, quality of military 
personnel and tactics, determination, geography, political climate, or even just about the 
relative probability of different outcomes. 
The possibility of a bargaining failure due to asymmetric information has a solid 
foundation in economics, and was made very clear in work by Myerson and Satterthwaite 
(1983). To see the basic insights in the context of war, suppose that there are two 
countries and one of them, referred to as country A, has unknown strength. In particular, 
suppose that country A can either be strong or weak with equal probability in the eyes of 
the other country. Imagine that war involves a relatively small cost, that the victor in a 
war gains control of all resources, and that war results in one of the two countries 
conquering the other. Suppose that if country A is strong then it wins a war with 
probability 3/4 and if it is weak it wins with probability 1/4. So, in order to always avoid 
a war, an agreement must provide the strong version of country A with at least 3/4 of all 
resources less the cost of war (in expectation, presuming it maximizes expected payoff). 
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Now the asymmetry of information enters:  a weak version of country A cannot be 
distinguished from a strong one by country B.  Thus if the strong version of country A 
always gets at least 3/4 of the resources less the cost of war, then since a weak version of 
the country cannot be distinguished from a strong version by country B, a weak version 
of country A must also expect at least 3/4 of the total resources less the cost of war, as it 
can mimic a strong version of the country and get a high payoff without risk of war. This 
means that country B must get at most 1/4 of all resources plus the cost of war. If the cost 
of war is low enough, then the country B is better off simply going to war and taking its 
chances rather than reaching such an unfavorable bargain. This is obviously a highly 
stylized example, but it encapsulates the difficulties with bargaining in the face of 
asymmetric information. Generally, it may be difficult for a weak country to pretend to 
be a strong one, but there can still be some degree of asymmetric information across 
countries and even lesser asymmetries can make it impossible to find agreements that all 
parties will agree to in all circumstances. 
It is important to note that imperfect information about the opponent's resolve or 
strength is a source of conflict that does not require any violation of common knowledge 
of rationality. The above reasoning is such that all the actors are fully rational, understand 
the setting, and fully comprehend all of its implications. It is also clear that the countries 
would like to avoid the difficulty. In particular, a strong version of country A would like 
to be able to distinguish itself from the weak version. If it could credibly demonstrate its 
strength, that would solve the problem. That is, if strength can be revealed peacefully and 
credibly (even at some minor cost), then there is a bargain which works as follows: if 
country A reveals strength, then it gets 3/4 of all resources and if it does not reveal its 
strength then it is presumed to be weak and only gets 1/4 of all resources. This solves the 
incentive problem as the weak version of country A can no longer pretend to be strong. 
Weakness is presumed unless evidence is presented to the contrary. This provides some 
insight into why countries might be willing to demonstrate arms (for instance publicly 
testing nuclear devices, holding military parades and exercises in observable settings, and 




 but in settings where binding agreements can be reached there 
are powerful incentives for the strongest types to reveal their strength to distinguish 
themselves from weaker types and to cement their bargaining position. Moreover, this is 
not limited to settings with just two potential strengths. Even with many different 
gradations of strength, the strongest wants to reveal itself, and then the next strongest will 
want to reveal itself, and so forth and this then unravels so all but the weakest types want 
to distinguish themselves. So this is robust to much richer information environments than 
the example above. 
With such asymmetries of information, whether war will occur will depend on the 
extent to which the private information of individuals can be credibly revealed or not as 
well as how relevant the private information is to forecasting the outcome of a war. If it is 
really impossible to fully and credibly reveal information and such information is critical 
to predicting the outcome of a potential war, it can be that bargaining will fail and war 
must be expected with at least some probability.   An early paper providing a model of 
war decisions with asymmetrically informed countries, and pointing out that an 
uninformed country may sometimes have to go to war to avoid bluffing behavior by an 
informed country,  is Brito and Intriligator (1985). 
The form of information asymmetry discussed above concerns potential outcomes 
of a war. A second information-based reason for a bargaining failure is that agents have 
inconsistent beliefs. For example, it could be that two states each are optimistic and are 
convinced that they will benefit from a war. In these cases war can erupt, as long as the 
inconsistency of beliefs is large enough to compensate for the cost of war. For instance, if 
both parties expect to win a war with a high enough probability, then there would not 
exist any agreement that avoids war.
9
   The possibility and examples of wars that are 
attributed to such miscalculations or errors due to lack of information or to different 
                                                          
8
 For example, see Slantchev (2007). 
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 At some level to have a war and such inconsistent beliefs when bargaining is possible, it is critical that the 
information structure and the rationality of the agents not be common knowledge, as defined in the seminal 
paper by Aumann (1976).      
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priors about relative power have been discussed informally by Blainey (1973), Gartzke 
(1999), Wagner (2000), Smith and Stam (2003), among others.  
A third form of information asymmetry concerns incomplete information about 
the motivations of other agents. Here it is believed that there is some probability that the 
other actor might be irrational.
10
 This includes spiraling models such as those discussed 
in Waltz (1959) and Schelling (1963), and more recently Kydd (1997). These ideas have 
been elaborated and extended upon by Baliga and Sjöström (2004) and subsequent 
works. The idea common to these works is that even a small probability of being faced by 
an armed irrational foe can lead a rational country to arm to some level.  In turn, this now 
means that either a foe who is irrational, or a foe who thinks that I might be irrational will 
be arming, and this then leads me to arm even more, and this feedback continues to build. 
Depending on the specifics of the payoffs to arming and potential conflict, it can be that 
the rational countries each arm to very high levels and are ready to attack first because of 
the fear that the other side  may attack first.   In some cases, communication can help 
overcome this problem, since it can be in both countries’ interests to be known to be 
rational, but this depends on the specifics of the setting and the type of communication 
available,as Baliga and Sjöström (2009) show.   
3.2  Commitment problems 
Commitment problems are probably the single most pervasive reason for 
bargaining failure.  This applies to many aspects of agreements that might avoid conflict, 
including promises to make future transfers and/or not to attack in the future. The 
implications of the inability to guarantee an agreement have been understood for 
centuries and, for instance, underlies the basic anarchic state of nature described by 
Hobbes (1651) in the Leviathan. As Hobbes states (1651, Chapter 13), "Because of this 
distrust amongst men, the most reasonable way for any man to make himself safe is to 
strike first, that is, by force or cunning subdue other men - as many of them as he can, 
until he sees no other power great enough to endanger him. This is no more than what he 
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just that rational actors allow for this possibilityand react to it. 
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needs for his own survival, and is generally allowed." Effectively there is nothing 
stopping someone from grabbing resources except fear of retaliation. Hobbes goes on to 
suggest that reasonable people can come to realize the inherent difficulties with anarchy 
and cede their rights to a Leviathan in order to live in peace. However, such social 
contracts do not generally appear in the international arena, and hence for an agreement 
to endure it has to be balanced in such a way as to be self-enforcing. In some cases, an 
outside authority, for instance an international organization such as the UN, can serve as 
an enforcer of an agreement, but the role of that international organization and its 
members’ incentives to really enforce the agreement are then part of a bigger picture 
where things need to be self-enforcing. Powell (2006) provides a rich set of illustrations 
of the pervasiveness of commitment problems.
11
  
What does self-enforcement entail? Effectively it must be that, in terms of our 
earlier discussion, the costs of war subsequent to whatever transfers of wealth or territory 
become overwhelmingly high. That is, for an agreement to be self-sustaining the states 
need to be sufficiently balanced in terms of strength and the allocation of resources, so 
that a war would not benefit any of the states in expectation. It can also be that even if 
one does not start at such a situation, then by giving up some resources one of the states 
becomes a less attractive target or a less threatening adversary and one reaches a situation 
where the costs of war outweigh the potential gains and so peace is self-enforcing. (See 
Bevia and Corchon (2009) for some discussion). Another way in which things might be 
made self-enforcing involves reputation. If a country faces potential conflicts with many 
other countries, then abiding by an agreement with one country can make it possible to 
credibly abide by agreements in other cases. Thus, it may be in a country's interest to 
abide by a collection of many agreements even when it might prefer to breach any single 
one of the agreements in isolation. Such self-enforcement involves embedding in a rich 
context and will depend on a variety of factors. 
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 15 
Let us also comment on some of the ways that a lack of commitment in 
agreements might lead to war.
12
 
3.2.1 Commitment not to attack after a received transfer or to 
deliver inter-temporal transfers 
The most basic difficulty with a lack of commitment is the obvious one. A 
country delivering resources cannot trust that the other will not demand more or attack 
after receiving the resources.  A notable example of such a failure of appeasement due to 
a lack of commitment is the Munich Agreement of 1938, after which Hitler invaded 
Czechoslovakia despite the agreement.   
One idea that has been explored in terms of avoiding such difficulties is to make a 
series of transfers at a carefully determined rate over time that balances the incentives for 
conflict against anticipated future transfers.   It is not always possible for such an 
approach to work, but it can in some circumstances, depending on which transfers are 




3.2.2 First Strike Advantages and Preemptive War 
As the quote of Hobbes makes clear, one difficulty in attaining peace is that the 
natural anarchy in which international relations reside often leads to a first-strike 
advantage (preemption).   That is, an element of stealth or surprise provides a significant 
advantage. If there were no first-strike advantage, and countries could have a well-
founded expectation of the expected outcome of war, then there would be some mutual 
allocation of resources leading to a better outcome for all countries than war (presuming 
that the allocation does not further alter the expected outcome of war). That agreement 
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also Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) and Querou (2009)), is that players can commit to accepting no less 
than a certain fraction of the pie.  If players can make simultaneous commitments it is possible for them to 
reach incompatible demands  in settings with uncertainty about whether commitments are binding. 
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 Schwarz and Sonin (2008) show that war can be avoided with a continuous stream of transfers that 
comes at a fast enough rate to always have the aggressor wish to delay rather than attack. 
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becomes self-enforcing since it provides countries each with more than their expected 
resources after a war, and so war is worse for all involved in expectations. However, this 
presumes that the expected outcome of a war is the same independent of how the war 
starts. In many cases, the outcome depends on who initiates a war. A significant offensive 
advantage to war can lead war to be inevitable. As a simple illustration, imagine two 
evenly matched countries with an even split of resources and a cost to war. If war leads to 
an evenly matched outcome regardless of who attacks first or under what circumstances,  
then peace is self-enforcing. In contrast, if a country that strikes first gains a large 
advantage by doing so, and expects to gain resources with a high enough probability, then 
peace is destabilized. Each country would like to strike before the other, and also 
understands that the other also has an incentive to attack first, and so must react by 
expecting a war,  and so war becomes inevitable. Various models of this appear in Powell 
(1991), Fearon (1995), Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2008), and Morelli and Rohner 
(2009). 
3.2.3 Preventive war 
Even in situations where countries are balanced in the short run, a country may 
fear that an opponent will become stronger over time and that the balance will be 
destabilized over time,, and may therefore wish to attack today to prevent being attacked 
by a stronger opponent in the future. Taylor (1954) is an early reference for this 
perspective, arguing that wars among great powers between 1848 and 1918 can be 
explained as preventive wars. 
Interestingly, preventive incentives are not just an issue when countries are evenly 
matched and anticipate becoming unevenly matched in the future, but also when one 
country has a current arms advantage and worries that the other will catch up in the future 
and that the future situation will be unstable (possibly due to first-strike advantages, or 
some other considerations), and so wishes to attack while the balance is in their favor. 
This was an important concern during the early period of the cold war when the United 
States had nuclear weapon capabilities and the Soviet Union did not. There were debates 
about whether or not the U.S. should fight a preventative war during both the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations.  The fact that this did not happen has been argued to be due 
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to a feeling that this was inconsistent with democratic principles (e.g., see the discussion 
in Silverstone (2007) and Levy (2008)), but from a purely rationalist perspective it might 
be that the fear of the future instability was insufficient to engage in a war at that time. 
3.2.4 War as part of a dynamic bargaining process 
Leventoglu and Slantchev (2007) report that almost 70 percent of conflicts end 
with a negotiated settlement, and almost no conflict ends with the complete elimination 
of one side, and hence the theory should explain why in many cases a commitment/self-
enforcement problem disappears over time and a negotiated settlement eventually 
becomes feasible. They provide conditions, viewing war as part of a dynamic bargaining 
process, for a limited war to happen in equilibrium, and commitment to a negotiated 
settlement to appear after a period of war.
14
 
In summary, the pervasiveness of commitment problems comes from the lack of 
any external enforcement device in an international setting, and so any agreement is 
really only lasting if it is in the interest of all parties to continue to abide by it.  A simple 
transfer of resources will not suffice unless it aligns incentives, or there are larger 
reputational concerns involved, or transfers are delicately arranged inter-temporally.   
There are many factors in such anarchic settings that naturally lead to instability such as 
preemptive and preventive motives, as well as the earlier mentioned asymmetries of 
information. 
3.3 Indivisibilities and other physical impediments 
Consider a situation where a fairly precisely balanced agreement needs to be 
reached in order to avoid conflict.  If it is difficult to finely divide territory, or other 
natural resources in ways that strike the exact balance needed, that could lead to an 
inability to reach an agreement in the face of war. While indivisibilities are a seemingly 
important impediment to bargaining, Fearon (1995) dismisses them as a significant 
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 Yared (2008) extends this analysis to incorporate commitment problems and asymmetric information as 
potential combined causes of limited wars during the bargaining process. For other perspectives on war as 
part of a bargaining process, see Bloch et al. (2006), Sanchez-Pages (2005), and Chassang and Padro i 
Miquel (2009). 
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explanation for war.   Even if some resources are indivisible, it must be that there are no 
other resources that could be used to compensate.
15
 Agreements involving trade of large 
sections of land and money (e.g., the Louisiana Purchase), are plentiful, and the many 
dimensions through which wealth can be transferred from one state to another make it 
rare that a war occurs as a result from an inability to divide resources. 
In terms of other impediments, delays in communication can make basic forms of 
bargaining difficult or impossible. While that is less of an issue in modern times, it was a 
substantial hurdle in times where armies might end up weeks or months in distance away 
from the leaders that commissioned them (as in the crusades). This leads to substantial 
delays in communication between the main parties involved in a potential conflict, and in 
such settings reaching an agreement that avoids conflict may be precluded even if such an 
agreement exists. 
3.4 Agency problems 
Even when decision makers are fully informed and have perfectly consistent 
beliefs, conflict may still be rationally chosen when there are differences in preferences 
between decision-makers and the rest of their country (a principal-agent problem). As 
explained in Jackson and Morelli (2007), when the decision-makers are biased relative to 
their countries war can occur, regardless of the availability of enforceable or binding 
agreements.
16
 The leader of a country might not face the same risks as the country's 
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 As Powell (2006) points out, there is another way to avoid indivisibilities.  Even if there are no other 
resources to transfer, the two sides could always resort to a lottery that has the same odds as the war but 
without the cost.  The answer as to why such a lottery might not work then relates back to an inability to 
commit to abide by the agreement ex post.   
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 See Lake (1992) for an alternative notion of bias and Bevia and Corchon (2009) for an extension of the 
Jackson and Morelli (2007) theory and for some related predictions on the role of inequality. 
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 Implicitly, there is a sort of contracting failure here in aligning the leader’s preferences with that of the 
citizenship.   This might be due to an inability to contract with the leader and so represent some sort of 
commitment problem or other bargaining failure.  Or, as we discuss below, it might even be that the 
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Furthermore, as Jackson and Morelli (2007) point out, it can even be that a 
country would like to choose leaders that have different preferences from that of the 
country to improve their bargaining position. Overall the risk of war that this implies ex 
ante can be compensated by the ability of a hawkishly-biased leader to obtain better deals 
at bargaining tables.
18
 This means that even though democracies might be expected to 
have unbiased leaders who represent the preferences of the average citizen, unbiasedness 
cannot be guaranteed in democracies either.. 
Clearly, the ways in which leaders come to power differ across political regimes 
and this can affect the type of leader that emerges and the extent to which they represent 
the population as a whole. According to the selectorate theory in Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003), democratic leaders need a larger coalition to support them relative to non 
democratic leaders. Keeping a larger coalition satisfied is more costly and hence losing a 
war is relatively more costly for democratic leaders, and generally makes them less prone 
to war.  
3.5 Multilateral bargaining failures 
As an illustration of the potential bargaining failures that arise in a multilateral 
setting, let us consider a simple three-state conflict. Suppose that there are three equally 
powerful countries with equal resources.   Also suppose that if two countries cooperate, 
they can easily defeat the third with relatively low costs of war. In such a situation any 
pair of countries can expect to get almost all of the resources in the world by ganging up 
on the third. There is no bargain that is stable here.
19
 If the countries are about to sign an 
agreement, it must be that at least one of the countries gets at least a third of the total 
resources. The other two countries could gain by not signing the agreement, cooperating 
to defeat this third country and then afterwards splitting the resources evenly (and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
citizens gain by having a leader whose bargaining position is more hawkish than they would have if they 
were bargaining on their own behalf. 
18
 Freshtman and Judd (1987) and Jones (1989) develop a similar delegation logic in different contexts.  
Querou (2009b) examines agency issues in collective bargaining settings. 
19
 Stability has many meanings in international relations, as can be seen in Nyou et al. (1989). In this 
example any basic notion of multilateral stability fails. 
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What happens in settings with multilateral interactions will depend on the 
specifics of the bargaining process, the relative powers of different coalitions, and many 
other factors. What is clear, however, is that with three or more countries the fact that 
there is complete information, divisible outcomes, and an enforceable bargaining 
technology does not preclude war. This is an important and relatively unexplored 
territory in the theory of war, and given the innumerable wars that involve more than two 
states, understanding multilateral bargaining and war is an important area for future 
research. 
Let us add a remark to this. Even when there are just two countries involved in a 
war, it might be multilateral considerations that derail peace. Although countries are 
sometimes discussed as if they are unitary actors, it is clear that they are composed of 
many actors with different objectives. As we know from the basics of collective decision 
making, an organization that is comprised of many actors does not necessarily act as if it 
were maximizing some objective function. Basic voting cycles can emerge and so a 
country composed of individually rational actors can exhibit intransitivities and other 
inconsistencies in its decision making that make the country difficult or impossible to 
bargain with.    
 
4. Democratic Peace  
As an example of how the various theories interact, let us consider a well-studied 
empirical regularity in international relations, namely the "democratic peace"; i.e., the 
observation that democracies rarely go to war with one another (e.g., see Doyle (1986) 
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 This is what is known as an empty core in the cooperative game theory literature. See Ray (2007) for a 
recent discussion of multilateral interactions and the possibility of reaching binding agreements and how 
that depends on the presence of local public goods. 
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and Russett (1993)).  The idea that incentives of aristocrats to go to war differ from that 
of democratic leaders is not new, and is well articulated by Kant (1795). 
An important explanation of democratic peace is an agency one.  As discussed 
above, Jackson and Morelli (2007) point out, when a leader has a disproportionately high 
share of benefits relative to costs from war when compared to the average citizen, then 
war can occur, but such a war will not occur if self-enforcing agreements are feasible and 
leaders are unbiased representatives.   This "unbiased peace" result can be viewed as an 
explanation of democratic peace, since the checks and balances of a democracy can help 
reduce the chance of having a biased leader. 
Conconi et al. (2009) extend this argument from Jackson and Morelli (2007), 
introducing an explicit election and reelection mechanism to control the bias of leaders. 
They show, theoretically and empirically, that the incentives of reelection can lead 
leaders to be unbiased in their decision-making, but that democratically elected leaders 
who do not face re-election can act similarly to autocratic leaders.  Thus, the democratic 
peace observations are refined, and it is democratically elected leaders who face 
reelection who do not go to war with other democratically elected leaders also facing 
reelection.  But autocrats or democratically elected leaders under the last term of a term-
limit can diverge from the population’s interests and go to war.   So it seems that a 
driving force behind the democratic peace is how a leader's incentives are kept in line 
with the population through potential reelection.
21
 
It is worth noting that the interactions between an executive’s behavior and 
election prospects can be quite complicated.  For example, going counter to the 
incentives to avoid conflict when facing reelection, there are also ``wag the dog’’ sorts of 
situations, such as that described by Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001), where an 
incumbent leader facing poor reelection prospects has greater incentives to initiate a war.  
The Hess and Orphanides (1995) explanation is that a conflict might reveal information 
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 For an analysis of the political costs of war for different regimes, see also Bueno de Mesquita and 
Siverson (1995) and Chiozza and Goemans (2004) . See Downs and Rocke (1994) and Tarar (2006) for 
different discussions of the incentives of an executive to engage in war relative to the electorate's incentives 
to retain the executive.   
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about the leader’s abilities to the electorate that increases the probability of reelection.  
As Hess and Orphanides (2001b) suggest, such behavior can be correlated with 
recessions where an incumbent may be at a disadvantage.     
Moving to the role of asymmetric information for the explanation of democratic 
peace, Fearon (1997) emphasized that so called "audience costs" (the cost of 
misrepresentations) are much higher in a democracy, and substantial audience costs can 
make signaling of information more effective in democracies, which in turn reduces 
asymmetries in information, and thus reduces the probability of war.   
Fearon (2008) emphasizes another channel to rationalize democratic peace that 
involves commitment issues. The stronger country between two potential contenders 
usually has a higher GDP per capita. If it is democratic, then, even if the leader promises 
to a set of supporters some benefits from the war, it cannot avoid the possibility that 
eventually, once democratic rules apply to the unified country in case of victory, the GDP 
per capita of the winning country will go down. Hence voters of a richer democracy who 
believe that the unified country will lead to wealth redistribution should be against the 
war, and hence only weak contenders should remain interested in wars. However, weaker 
countries will generally have less interest in entering a conflict to begin with due to a low 
probability of success. 
5. Endogenous Power 
So far we have not talked much about the incentives of countries to arm. It is 
important to recognize that the probability of war depends on  prior investments in arms, 
and that in turn the incentives to arm depend on how arms affect future incentives to go 
to war or to bargain. Thus, to fully understand decisions to go to war, such decisions 
cannot be divorced from the broader endogenous armament environment in which they 
reside. 
There are studies of armament decisions in the case where conflict is inevitable 
(or bargaining is inevitable), such as that of Hirshleifer (1989, 1995) and Skaperdas 
(1992). The case were both decisions, whether to arm and whether to attack, are present 
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is analyzed in Powell (1993) and Jackson and Morelli (2009). The key difference in the 
analyses is the timing of the arming decisions. Powell's model leads to peace, and is one 
where countries move in alternating time periods and have their armament levels fixed 
for the intermediate periods. In such a setting, country 1 will set its arms at a level that it 
knows will be sufficient to deter the other country. The other country when called upon to 
move must then set its arms at a similar level, to deter future attacks when the first 
country can readjust its arms. This results in constant positive armaments and perpetual 
peace. In Jackson and Morelli (2009), the armament decisions are simultaneous, so that 
there is a sense in which countries cannot fully react to each other's armament levels but 
must anticipate them. In that setting, for a range of scenarios, countries randomize
22
 
between a variety of strategies that must include hawkish, dovish, and deterrence 
armament levels. Of course, this is in the absence of commitment, as otherwise countries 
would sign binding agreements not to attack each other and the question of armament 
would become moot. The intuition behind why war is inevitable and some variation in 
arms levels necessarily result is fairly straightforward. A complete lack of arms on the 
part of both countries is not a stable outcome, since a country that anticipates that the 
other will be completely unprotected, would prefer to arm and attack (presuming that the 
costs of war are not overwhelmingly high, in which case perpetual peace and no arms are 
an equilibrium).    Let us then consider the other extreme, where both countries  arm to a 
high level, and mutually deter attacks.  This also fails to be an equilibrium point.  Given 
that there is a positive cost of war, it is true that if the countries are both heavily armed, 
then neither wants to attack the other. However, given the costs of war, deterrence is still 
assured if one country slightly reduces its arms.  Given the savings of arms costs, then it 
cannot be an equilibrium for mutually high levels, as one country should lower its arms 
level to a slightly lower deterrence level. This incentive then ends up ratcheting down the 
arms levels, as it is always better to have slightly lower arms than the other country given 
that war will not occur if arms levels are close enough to each other. However, if we keep 
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 It is a bit strange to think of countries randomizing in armament decisions. In fact, it is not at all 
necessary that the country randomize, but just that its decision making process not be fully predictable to 
the other country. What is critical is that the other country be unsure of the precise armament level that its 
opponent will take. 
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ratcheting arms levels down so that the countries are not arming very much, then we 
return to the first reasoning that one of the countries should deviate to arm heavily and go 
to war. So, there is no stable pair of arms levels, and the equilibrium must involve some 
randomization, and over at least several types of arms levels. Jackson and Morelli also 
investigate comparative statics when there is a probability that the countries will have an 
opportunity to bargain (in a credible way) to avoid a war. Increasing the probability of a 
bargaining opportunity leads countries to make less use of deterrence armament strategies 
and more use of hawkish and dovish strategies, so the possibility of potential conflict 
increases. The idea is that as bargaining becomes more likely, deterrence strategies 
become less valuable, all else held equal, as do hawkisk strategies, while dovish 
strategies become more valuable. To ensure stability, one needs to increase the use of 
dovish strategies, which then reestablishes value to the hawkish strategies and increases 
their use, which then also maintains a reason to have at least some deterrence activity. 
The overall comparative statics that come out of this are that there is a lower probability 
of war due to the increased bargaining opportunities; however, there is a higher 
probability of war conditional on bargaining not being feasible.  
Interestingly, peaceful outcomes are not necessarily the efficient ones in such 
endogenous-arms settings. Arms are wasteful, and so having many periods of peace but 
with costly armament levels can be worse than simply having an early conflict and then 
thereafter living in a unified country with peace without the need for arms.
23
 
Another interesting case is the one in which arms remain unobservable even after 
the investment phase has ended and war is about to start. Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) 
analyze this case, and they also show that war cannot be avoided even if bargaining 
technologies exist. In their case, the source of the positive probability of war is 
asymmetric information, whereas in Jackson and Morelli's observable case the bargaining 
failures fall under the category of commitment and enforcement frictions.   
Beyond these models of endogenous power, there are also models such as that of 
Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2008).  They do comparative statics in weapons stocks 
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 For this last observation, see also Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000). 
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which sheds light on the incentives to arm and which sorts of arms and levels of arms 
countries might seek.   They note that the advantage to a first strike affects the perceived 
value to the attacker, while the incentive to preemptively attack rather than risk being 
attacked is something that comes out of the payoffs of the potential target.  Increasing the 
arms of just one country increases the advantage over an opponent in terms of a striking 
first which can increase preemption tensions.  However, mutual increases in arms can 
lower the risk of suffering an attack and lower preemption tensions. They use this to note 
that extremely destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons can produce a more even 
balance and result in mutual deterrence, while arming with less destructive weapons 
might provide enough of an asymmetry that it results in incentives to strike first, and thus 
also an incentive to preemptively attack. 
6. The duration of wars 
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, part of the importance of understanding 
the various reasons for war is that different scenarios lead to different sorts of outcomes. 
To see this most starkly, consider a situation where a war starts due to a lack of 
commitment. In such a case a war can be protracted. A peace agreement only becomes 
attainable after the balance of power has shifted so that it becomes in both sides’ interest 
to agree to peace. This can take a long time.    In contrast, if bargaining is possible, but 
fails due to asymmetric information about the relative strengths of countries, then a 
bargain should be reached as soon as the relative strengths of the countries becomes 
clear. This may take some time, but might happen much more quickly, and with lower 
costs, than it would take for the balance of power to shift significantly enough to lead to 
self-enforcement. 
Exactly how long the war might last when there is no ability to commit can 
depend on many factors. In the case of asymmetric information, a model that offers 
predictions in this regard, where a country learns about another country's strength or 
resolve over time, is often referred to as a war of attrition (e.g., see Smith (1974) and 
Bishop and Cannings (1978)). The time at which a war of attrition ends depends on the 
specifics of the gain from winning,  the costs of staying in the conflict,  the patience of 
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the actors, and the level of uncertainty. The basic structure is one where two opponents 
incur costs at some rate per unit of time as long as they stay in conflict. The first one to 
give up loses and the other one wins. The uncertainty can be about the value to the other 
from winning, or the cost of conflict, or the patience. As the conflict goes on, it reveals 
that the other has not yet given up indicating a higher patience, lower cost, or greater 
patience. Eventually one of the two sides gives up. 
It should be clear that our discussion applies to many sorts of conflicts and not 
just to inter-state wars.  For example it applies to things like civil wars, coups and 
revolutions, and even strikes and other social and economic conflicts.  Indeed, even some 
of the literature that is specifically aimed at understanding conflict in one arena can shed 
light on others.  As an example, Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) provide an 
explanation for the long duration of some civil wars.
24
  They explain that a government 
can fear having too strong a military, as a strong military can initiate coups especially in 
contexts where a government cannot commit to maintaining the resources directed to the 
military once a conflict ends.  Understanding this interaction between a government and a 
military thus provides an additional lens into arming decisions, which then not only 
affects the number of conflicts that take place internally and their duration (as for 
instance a weaker military may take a long time to eradicate a rebel group), but then also 
has implications for the likelihood and potential duration of external conflicts.     
7. Concluding remarks 
We have presented a rich framework within which we can understand the 
prerequisites for war. Although our discussion has drawn mainly from the large literature 
on inter-state war, many of the same issues are at play in civil wars and other forms of 
conflict. Again, there must exist incentives for conflict and some barriers to the ability to 
reach an enforceable bargain. Some revolutions and coups arise from an agency problem 
either on the part of the current ruler or the leader of the attack. Some civil wars erupt 
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because of ethnic or religious diversities manifesting themselves in the form of 
multilateral bargaining failures. 
Although the theoretical understanding of the various causes of wars is 
developing well, and there are innumerable case studies of war and analyses of particular 
conflicts, systematic empirical work that analyzes the origins of wars across many cases 
is still relatively lacking. A richer understanding of the origins of wars would help further 
advance the theory, and would help in sorting more frequent and important causes from 
those which are less so; and ultimately would help in developing policies aimed at 
avoiding the costs of conflict. 
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